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Abstract: One aspect of the present paper is to draw out the Adam Smith in 
Friedrich Hayek. I suggest that common economic talk of market communication, 
market error and correction, and policy error and correction invokes a spectatorial 
being and appeals to our sympathy with such being. Behind such common 
economic talk, I suggest, are implicit allegories wherein an allegorical figure runs 
a system of superior knowledge, communication, and voluntary cooperation. 
Theoretical discussions of social error invoke the notion of agent error applied to 
the allegorical being. Similarly, theoretical talk of social correction invokes the 
notion of agent correction applied to the allegorical being. The allegory behind 
such talk is vital and necessary because without it the talk of social or market 
communication, error, and correction cannot be sustained. Unfolding the allegory 
clarifies the meaning, limitations, and value of such talk. Making what had been 
implicit explicit helps economists to avoid overstating their generalizations or 
making those generalizations sound more precise and accurate than they are. 
Meanwhile, scholars have pointed out that spectating impartially involves 
something of a paradox – distant-closeness, or cool-warmth. Concurring, I 
explore the connections between the features of the allegorical being and the 
doings of the economic agents. I suggest that the cogency of such theorizing 
depends on such correspondences, and that they are matters of culture, of both the 
context within which the theorizing is done and of the context theorized about.  
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Unfolding the Allegory behind Market Communication and Social 




This opinion or apprehension, I say, seems first to be impressed by nature. Men 
are naturally led to ascribe to those mysterious beings, whatever they are, which 
happen, in any country, to be the objects of religious fear, all their own sentiments 
and passions. They have no other, they can conceive no other to ascribe to them. 
Those unknown intelligences which they imagine but see not, must necessarily be 
formed with some sort of resemblance to those intelligences of which they have 
experience. 
        Adam Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments (163-64) 
 
The only difference between [the system which places virtue in utility] and that 
which I have been endeavouring to establish, is, that it makes utility, and not 
sympathy, or the correspondent affection of the spectator, the natural and original 
measure of this proper degree. 
        Ib. (306) 
 
Adam Smith enumerated not one but four sources of moral approval. What they 
were does not concern us just now – the paragraph (TMS, 326-27) is reproduced here as 
an appendix. Though underplaying the tensions among the four sources, Smith 
nonetheless showed awareness of the tensions as well as of the difficulty in 
distinguishing them. Smith did not pretend to any integration of the four sources. He did 
not pretend to solve for overall moral judgment. In fact, he scoffed at the pretense or 
aspiration of definitive resolution. Overall moral judgment, rather, is in the realm of the 
―loose, vague, and indeterminate,‖ like ―the rules that critics lay down for the attainment 
of what is sublime and elegant in composition‖ (TMS, 175, 327).    3 
The vague rules are explored by way of figurative or allegorical reasoning.
2 Smith 
invokes or sketches beings who judge the action or conduct. The rules of their judgment 
are vague but not empty or arbitrary. The figurative beings have ethical sensibilities, the 
sensibilities imparted by Smith‘s discourse. Conjuring the judges, Smith explores overall 
moral judgment in terms of what aspects in human conduct they regard as beautiful or 
becoming. Overall moral judgment is an aesthetics of human agency.
3 The judges are like 
the panel of judges of a figure-skating competition. They score performances; they 
indicate which they like and why. But they do not pretend to any determinate formula or 
precise grammar for figure-skating aesthetics. Their scores are rarely in exact agreement.  
By marking their judgment in particular instances, enabling us to surmise their 
sensibilities,
4 Smith enables us to react to the judges, to discover whether we comfortably 
―enter into‖ their interpretations and attitudes, whether our sentiments ―beat time‖ with 
theirs. We judge the judges. We do so by appealing to higher judges; we proceed, as it 
were, to the even sketchier panel that assesses the panel that assesses figure-skating. 
Smith sketches the spectator not as a purely austere and inscrutable authority who issues 
an exact code of righteousness, but in essential respects as a being close to ourselves and 
to whom we morally respond. As Fonna Forman-Barzilai (2005) has explained, there is a 
                                                 
2 I find one dictionary definition of allegory as: ―an expressive style that uses fictional characters and 
events to describe some subject by suggestive resemblances; an extended metaphor.‖ 
3 Indeed, Smith could pass seamlessly between science and aesthetics. He narrated the history of astronomy 
as a quest for successively more beautiful or satisfying systems, and in treating music he spoke of the mind 
enjoying ―not only a very great sensual, but a very high intellectual, pleasure, not unlike that which it 
derives from the contemplation of a great system in any other science‖ (EPS, 205, italics added; see also 
212).  
4 Charles Griswold (199) beautifully highlights that for Smith an aesthetic sensibility is surmised from 
points or moments, not given as algorithm or formula: ―Just as we do not know what nature is in and of 
itself, so too we do not know what the imagination in and of itself is, but we can describe its works in all of 
the ways that I have specified. Since we lack a theoretical account of mind qua mind, we seem to be largely 
left with an account of mind in terms of how it comes to see nature in this or that particular way, and that 
is just the kind of account Smith aims to provide‖ (343, italics added).   4 
dualism in spectating impartially: To spectate knowingly one must be somewhat 
close/warm/soft toward the individual and his express part in the matter, but to judge 
impartiality one must be sufficiently distant/cool/tough toward that part, so as to do 
justice to the other parts touched by the matter (not just of other people but also of the 
first individual). The inherent dualism evokes Smith‘s (occasionally gendered
5) dialectic 
of amiable and respectable virtues (TMS, 23, 306). 
 
Smith says:  
All such sentiments suppose the idea of some other being, who is the natural 
judge of the person that feels them; and it is only by sympathy with the decisions 
of this arbiter of his conduct, that [the individual] can conceive, either the triumph 
of self-applause, or the shame of self-condemnation. (TMS, 193)
6 
 
Throughout Smith‘s work, figurative beings, though only sketchy, even 
subconscious, mediate social affairs and moral conduct. We relate to each other, and to 
ourselves, by way of substantive yet figurative beings, and how they would feel about the 
matters in view. In Smith‘s 1761 essay on the first formation of languages, he comes to 
the following sentences: 
The word I, does not, like the word man, denote a particular class of objects, 
separated from all others by peculiar qualities of their own. It is far from being the 
name of a species, but, on the contrary, whenever it is made use of, it always 
denotes a precise individual, the particular person who then speaks. It may be said 
to be, at once, both what the logicians call, a singular, and what they call, a 
common term; and to join in its signification the seemingly opposite qualities of 
the most precise individuality, and the most extensive generalization. (Smith 
1761, 219) 
 
                                                 
5 Humanity, which ―consists merely in the exquisite fellow-feeling,‖ ―is the virtue of a woman, generosity 
of a man. The fair-sex, who have commonly much more tenderness than ours, have seldom so much 
generosity‖ (TMS, 190). Also, Smith makes contrasting terms of ―resolute‖ and ―effeminate‖ (TMS, 187). 
6 Likewise, in a letter Smith affirms ―my Doctrine that our judgements concerning our own conduct have 
always a reference to the sentiments of some other being‖ (Corr., 49).   5 
The precise individuality is clear enough, but the word I also always carries ―the most 
extensive generalization,‖ for we always conjure general, albeit tacit, perhaps 
unconscious, even instinctual, sensations of a being, sensations that mediate our 
understanding of the person who writes I. We glean the general being that that person is 
like. For Smith, sympathy could be morally compelling even though ―illusive‖ or 
―imaginary‖ (e.g., TMS, 71, 78, 19, 21, 317). It is the nexus of such inchoate imaginings 
that enable us to relate to one another. 
I believe that economists practice the Smithian way but are reticent, even 
unconscious, about doing so. One cause of the reticence is that the figure does not 
conform to images of science as precise and accurate, or ―positive‖ and ―objective.‖ The 
Smithian awareness declares that economic judgment involves aesthetics, but popular 
images of science say that aesthetics are not supposed to play a role in scientific 
judgment. 
Economists often hold up the idea of economic efficiency as precise, accurate, 
positive, and objective. I would argue that such claims are overdone. ―As Frank H. 
Knight has so often emphasized, problems of welfare economics must ultimately dissolve 
into a study of aesthetics and morals‖ (Coase 1960, 43). A number of points argue that 
efficiency is much vaguer than often thought.
7  
                                                 
7 Some points one might make about why efficiency/willingness-to-pay concepts are often ambiguous 
would include: (1) The diminishing marginal utility of wealth; (2) The hypothetical nature of propositions, 
giving rise to ambiguities in, for example, the time-to-adjustment in deciding one‘s willingness to pay; (3) 
The collective action problems that might matter to the individual‘s contemplation of how much he would 
be willing to pay; (4) The issue of deeper, truer preferences, as opposed to unenlightened preferences, 
which is especially relevant in considering policy reforms; (5) Identity factors involved in changing policy; 
(6) In as much as a policy reform would alter future preferences, perhaps of the new and future generations, 
we have to consider what preferences are worth fostering; (7) The Smithian distinction (TMS, 68, 83, 137, 
188-92) between passive experience of the effects of a change and moral agency for the change; and (8) 
Economists often, perhaps usually, do not have good data on the willingnesses to pay that are most 
pertinent to their theoretical arguments.   6 
Here I unfold the allegory in important economic tropes. One is the market 
process as ―a system of telecommunications‖ (Hayek 1948, 87). In the literal sense, 
prices, profits, inventories, and so on communicate very little. In a figurative sense, 
however, prices may communicate how to advance the vast concatenation. When skeptics 
declare: ―What communication are you talking about?,‖ the economist – if unprepared to 
supply the allegory – can only offer explanations incorrect or nonsensical. 
Another is the idea of market, social, or policy error. We often say that society or 
policymakers have erred. When we get out the microscope, however, we might find that 
no one erred. How do we have social error without any agent error? Lying behind the 
social error is allegorical error. Similarly, we often speak of correction, as in the claim 
that governments do not correct themselves as well as markets. We can make sense of it 
by unfolding the underlying allegory.  
There are other economic tropes, not treated here, such as ―social cost/benefit‖
8 
and even ―the economy,‖ that may be clarified by bring out the allegory behind the text. 
In a number of ways, important economic discourse is made clearer, more correct, and 
more accountable by seeing the allegory behind the text.  
 
The Allegory behind Concatenate Coordination 
                                                                                                                                                 
And, where ―economic efficiency‖ is confined in such a way as to make it relatively precise and 
accurate, it really is a lower-level criterion for overall judgment. That is, narrower, more precise notions of 
economic efficiency are not a final arbiter of the social good. 
The following sentences appear at the very end of I.M.D. Little‘s book (1957) A Critique of 
Welfare Economics: ―Economic welfare is a subject in which rigour and refinement are probably worse 
than useless. … It is satisfying, and impressive, that a rigourous logical system, with some apparent reality, 
should have been set up in the field of the social sciences: but we must not let ourselves be so impressed 
that we forget that its reality is obviously limited; and that the degree of such reality is a matter of 
judgement and opinion‖ (279). 
8 James Buchanan‘s work often speaks of the allegorical basis behind talk of social costs and benefits, and 
of the economy.    7 
 
Elsewhere I have written about coordination,
9 so I keep this section brief.  
We must distinguish two kinds of coordination. One is the mutual coordination of 
Thomas Schelling (1960) and equilibrium modeling, particularly game theory – focal 
points, meeting at Grand Central station, ―battle of the sexes,‖ cheap talk, lock-in of 
conventions, coordination-problem macro-theory, and so on. The other is what 
economists up to 1960 principally understood by coordination, as used by Simon 
Newcomb, John Bates Clark, Thorstein Veblen, Frank H. Knight, Friedrich Hayek, 
Ronald Coase, and very many others.
10 That coordination was a quality of a 
concatenation of activities and factors. It invoked a judgment imputed to a mind imagined 
to behold the referent concatenation. If we refer to the concatenation within Smith‘s pin 
factory – ―placed at once under the view of the spectator‖ (WN, 14) – it is natural for the 
beholder to correspond to the owners, and to assume that the criterion behind 
coordinativeness was honest profits – a fairly precise and accurate rule. But when Hayek, 
Coase, and many others took the idea of coordination beyond the firm, just as Smith 
promptly took it to the global concatenation yielding the woolen coat, the precision and 
accuracy melted away. For the concatenation of the great skein, the imagined beholder is 
much less clearly defined. That did not stop them, however, from talking about 
coordination of the vast concatenation. Concatenate coordination invokes a Smithian sort 
of beholding, a figurative being. In talking about concatenate coordination we develop 
ideas of the sensibilities proper to such a being. The circle of ―we‖ tempers us to draw or 
entertain a being agreeable to the circle. We explore not only certain causes and effects 
                                                 
9 Klein 1997; Klein and Orsborn 2009. 
10 Klein and Orsborn (2009) report a JSTOR content analysis of five leading economics journals and tell 
how concatenate coordination once dominated but receded some time after 1960.   8 
narrowly conceived, but attitudes about the whole. We do so by discovering and 
cultivating our sympathetic reactions to figurative ―arbiters.‖ Smith, Marx, Veblen, 
Keynes, Hayek, Myrdal, and Friedman symbolize figures that are relatively focal in the 
culture. How finely we delineate the being depends on the discourse situation and the 
circle of ―we.‖ 
Adam Smith never used the word coordination, but the idea of concatenate 
coordination figures very prominently in his work and is plain enough, as when he wrote: 
Human society, when we contemplate it in a certain abstract and philosophical 
light, appears like a great, an immense machine, whose regular and harmonious 
movements produce a thousand agreeable effects. As in any other beautiful and 
noble machine that was the production of human art, whatever tended to render its 
movements more smooth and easy, would derive a beauty from this effect, and, 
on the contrary, whatever tended to obstruct them would displease upon that 
account: so virtue, which is, as it were, the fine polish to the wheels of society, 
necessarily pleases; while vice, like the vile rust, which makes them jar and grate 
upon one another, is as necessarily offensive. (TMS, 316; see also 165, 185) 
 
As Smith turns to market forces, he uses analogy to illuminate their marvels. He 
sketches an aspect of concatenate coordination: ―It is the interest of the people that their 
daily, weekly, and monthly consumption should be proportioned as exactly as possible to 
the supply of the season.‖  In the pursuit of profit, the grain dealer adjusts price in ways 
that conduce to such concatenate coordination: 
 
Without intending the interest of the people, he is necessarily led, by a regard to 
his own interest, to treat them, even in years of scarcity, pretty much in the same 
manner as the prudent master of a vessel is sometimes obliged to treat his crew. 
When he foresees that provisions are likely to run short, he puts them upon short 
allowance. Though from excess of caution he should sometimes do this without   9 
any real necessity, yet all the inconveniences which his crew can thereby suffer 
are inconsiderable in comparison of the danger, misery, and ruin to which they 
might sometimes be exposed by a less provident conduct. (WN, 525, italics 
added) 
 
The analogy of the prudent ship master is a miniature of the allegory of the being whose 
hand is invisible.  
Unfolding the allegory behind concatenate coordination helps us to address some 
big questions in economics. Unfolding the allegory helps us to clarify what it means for 
entrepreneurship to be coordinative, and to assess whether it is always coordinative or 
only usually coordinative (or, perhaps, not even usually). Unfolding the allegory helps us 
to clarify what we mean if we say free enterprise is a system of cooperation. Unfolding 
the allegory might spare one from misrepresenting or overstating the case for economic 
liberalism. Meanwhile, it may embolden liberals and economists –  by and large, 
entrepreneurship is coordinative, economic freedom does conduce to coordination, free 
enterprise is a system of cooperation – for we can justify those claims by virtue of, and 
only by virtue of, cogent allegories natural to human understanding.  
 
The Market System as a Communication System 
 
One way to explore the free-enterprise system is to liken it to a system of 
benevolence working by communication.  That is what Friedrich Hayek did in his famous 
essay ―The Use of Knowledge in Society‖ and elsewhere.  He posited the elimination of a   10 
source of tin, such as the collapse of a tin mine, traced out market adjustments, and said: 
―The whole acts as one market … so that through many intermediaries the relevant 
information is communicated to all.‖  Further: ―We must look at the price system as such 
a mechanism for communicating information if we want to understand its real function.‖  
And: ―It is more than a metaphor to describe the price system as a kind of machinery for 
registering change, or a system of telecommunications‖ (Hayek 1948, 85-87, italics 
mine). In his Nobel lecture, Hayek (1974) spoke of ―a communication system which we 
call the market‖ (7; see also Hayek 1955, 99; Lachmann 1956, 62). 
Hayek mostly avoided simile in speaking of the market system as a system of 
communication, just as Adam Smith did in speaking of the invisible hand.
11 But, God 
aside, Smith‘s ―invisible hand‖ is fictitious. I think that Hayek‘s ―communication‖ is no 
less fictitious. Indeed, the two are basically the same (at least as we confine Smith‘s 
invisible hand to the matters addressed by Hayek). If, when we say that the market 
system communicates knowledge, we are not prepared to elaborate the allegory, we can 
only speak falsehood or nonsense, for the statement is unsound save for the allegory. 
Hayek writes as though market signals – prices, profit and loss, inventories, etc. – 
are forms of communication telling people how to advance the general interest. We 
should, however, mind the element of communion, or community, in communication. In 
its literal sense, communication is a meeting of minds. The knowledge communicated 
                                                 
11 There are varied interpretations of Smith‘s ―invisible hand.‖ My view is of a traditional classical-liberal 
sort, broadly in line, I believe, with a great many including F.W. Maitland, William Smart, Edwin Cannan, 
F.W. Hirst, A.L. Macfie, Jacob Viner, Friedrich Hayek, Ronald Coase, E.G. West, D.D. Raphael, Ian Ross, 
Norman Barry, Ronald Hamowy, Karen Vaughn, Jerry Muller, Peter Minowitz, Jeffrey Young, James 
Otteson, Craig Smith, and N.E. Aydinonat. My view takes exception to those who diminish its importance, 
see it as very specific to the textual neighborhoods in which it appears, or treat its referent to be behavior 
that is merely ―self-interested,‖ for example, variously, William Grampp, Emma Rothschild, and Gavin 
Kennedy, as well as to those, like Joseph Stiglitz, who would interpret the invisible hand narrowly in terms 
of ―perfections‖ obtaining in certain equilibrium models.   11 
passes through us as commonly experienced ideas, images, or notions. It is much like the 
beat or melody of the music that Smith says we share. It passes through us in a common 
experience, neither mine, nor yours, but ours. An idea, image, or notion communicated is 
understood commonly by us, we feel the beat commonly or symmetrically.  
At the supermarket, where a carton of eggs bears the price $1.89, there is only one 
bit of communication in a literal sense: the supermarket telling you ―Yours for $1.89.‖  
As for the entrepreneur computing her profit or loss, there really is no communication in 
the literal sense, no meeting of minds – whose mind would she meet?  In no literal sense 
is the market system or anyone within it telling you to forgo tin or buy eggs. 
From knowledge communicated, each party makes inferences, and inferences 
may be closer or farther from the basic knowledge communicated. If the price of tin is 
five dollars, a close inference might be ―the price is higher than last month.‖ But as 
inferences get farther from the basic knowledge, it becomes less correct to say they have 
been communicated.  
Crucial to Hayek, in fact, is that people‘s inferences are highly asymmetric, that, 
contrary to the common-knowledge assumption, all information is not commonly 
interpreted.
12 Different people have different circumstances and perceive different 
opportunities in prices etc. They interpret asymmetrically. Even ―the price is high‖ might 
fit your interpretation but not mine. It makes little sense to say that inferences as to how 
one should respond to prices are matters of literal communication. We talk to merchants 
of their advantages, ready payment, said Smith, not our necessities, and even less our 
schemes.  
                                                 
12 Notable moments in Hayek‘s corpus on asymmetric knowledge would include many of the essays in 
Hayek 1948; as well as 1967; 1978; 1989.   12 
Hayek means an allegorical communication. Hayek addresses the allegory most 
explicitly in his 1933 lecture at the London School of Economics entitled ―The Trend of 
Economic Thinking‖: 
Unfortunately, this oldest and most general result of the theory of social 
phenomena [viz., the spontaneous coordination of individual efforts] has never 
been given a title which would secure it an adequate and permanent place in our 
thinking.  The limitations of language make it almost impossible to state it 
without using misleading metaphorical words.  The only intelligible form of 
explanation for what I am trying to state would be to say – as we say in German – 
that there is sense [Sinn] in the phenomena; that they perform a necessary 
function. (Hayek 1933, 27) 
 
We must work in a zone between embrace and rejection of such allegories: 
But as soon as we take such phrases in a literal sense, they become untrue.  It is an 
animistic, anthropomorphic interpretation of phenomena, the main characteristic 
of which is that they are not willed by any mind.  And as soon as we recognize 
this, we tend to fall into an opposite error, which is, however, very similar in kind: 
we deny the existence of what these terms are intended to describe. (Hayek 1933, 
27) 
 
During the remainder of his career, Hayek wrote only fleetingly of a ―social 
mind‖ in his own theorizing.
13 It may be that, launching as he did so fully into attacking 
collectivist thought, he underplayed the allegory behind his own text. James Buchanan is 
another thinker who notably struggles in the zone between embracing and rejecting the 
allegory – mostly rejecting but not always convincingly (see e.g., Buchanan 1999, 193-
96). 
But the figure was hardly unknown. For example, Edwin Cannan – an ardent 
Smithian and editor of The Wealth of Nations (1904) – wrote in 1902: ―The reason why it 
pays to do the right thing – to do nearly what an omniscient and omnipotent benevolent 
                                                 
13 Hayek (1937, 54).   13 
Inca would order to be done – are to be looked for in the laws of value‖ (461; italics 
mine). The free-enterprise system, Cannan suggests, leads to patterns of activities that 
please a benevolent being.  
Though the impartial spectator in Theory of Moral Sentiments is male, let‘s make 
her female, and let‘s call her Joy, a short name that connotes her benevolence. The 
allegory in Cannan‘s remark is that Joy‘s knowledge encompasses what Knud 
Haakonssen (1981, 79) distinguishes as system knowledge and contextual knowledge. 
Joy has system knowledge and contextual knowledge for every individual. The allegory, 
to continue, is that Joy issues instructions, or requests, cooperatively, to each market 
participant spelling out ―the right thing‖ to be done.  
Joy tells Bridget the baker that perhaps she should buy new ovens, look out for 
better deals in flour, and advertise her confections. Within the allegory, Joy 
communicates these instructions. Within the allegory there is a meeting of Joy‘s and the 
Bridget‘s minds regarding these actions. Within the allegory, Bridget, who is sensible to 
Joy‘s benevolence and ethical wisdom and who feels entrusted to advance what Joy finds 
beautiful, follows, not market signals, but Joy‘s communications, embraced voluntarily 
by Bridget from what Smith would call her sense of duty – she ―enters, if I may say so, 
into the sentiments of that divine Being‖ (TMS, 276) – and those communications tell her 
to take actions rather like the actions that the market signals would lead her to take. 
Cannan suggests that the market conduces to socially beneficial actions much as a 
benevolent system of superior knowledge, communication, and cooperation would.  
The allegory fits Smith‘s vision of virtuous behavior: 
But by acting according to the dictates of our moral faculties, we necessarily 
pursue the most effectual means for promoting the happiness of mankind, and   14 
may therefore be said, in some sense, to co-operate with the Deity, and to advance 
as far as in our power the plan of Providence. (Smith, TMS, 166; italics added) 
 
The pervasive modifiers ―nearly,‖ ―much as,‖ and so on, are necessary and 
important. If interests coincided neatly and perfectly (as Bastiat in Economic Harmonies 
(1850) seems to have suggested save for evil and error), then we would have much less 
trouble getting everyone to sympathize with a common, universal moral system. Morality 
would be a snap. Smith used harmony often but meant only a coarse or tolerable 
harmony. He writes, for example, that the sentiments of two people ―may, it is evident, 
have such a correspondence with one another, as is sufficient for the harmony of society. 
Though they will never be unisons, they may be concords, and this is all that is wanted or 
required‖ (TMS, 22). As Maitland (1875) put it, ―we cannot appeal to him as the father of 
those who see nothing but harmonies in political economy‖ (132, italics mine). Following 
Klamer, McCloskey, and Ziliak (2007), we may say that the central claims of Smithian 
political economy are enthymemes, that is, by and larges, not 100 percents. 
The figurative being exercises judgment, and we demand that its character or 
sensibilities be fleshed out. We want to know what kind of being we are being asked to 
go along with. We may well argue over the character of Joy. We distinguish multiple 
characterizations of Joy, perhaps as Joy1, Joy2, Joy3, etc., and highlight and contend over 
the differences.  Some are similar and form a family that we recognize and label. 
Sometimes we downplay the family bickering and work with the more generic family 
representative, highlighting differences among separate families ―socialist,‖ ―liberal,‖ 
―conservative,‖ – though also aware that all the Joys are of the broadest human family.   15 
The judging never ends, so we have to get used to the idea that any characterization of 
Joy invites a further. 
The game, however, is played by the rule that in some ultimate sense there is only 
one, universal Joy. 
Consider some generic person Joe. According to Smith, the grand, allegorical 
impartial spectator, whom I call Joy, is not Joe‘s conscience. Joe‘s conscience, or ―man in 
the breast,‖ is only a representative of the impartial spectator (TMS, 215). Rather, Joy is 
Joe‘s conscience‘s conscience‘s conscience‘s … conscience. Joy is universal in that she 
is also Mary‘s and everyone else‘s conscience‘s conscience‘s conscience‘s … 
conscience. Each person‘s series is unique, but every series leads to Joy—which is not to 
say that everyone‘s conduct and sentiment conforms to Joy. It is only a ground-rule for 
the discussion. 
Once we get comfortable, once a sense of Joy‘s character is sufficiently shared, 
once the circle of ―we‖ is mutually coordinated, the allegory opens up a fruitful way to 
think about institutional quality. What institutional arrangements generate the ―signals‖ 
that best ―communicate‖ what to do? Such talk gets us to focus on what the relevant 
signals are. It gets us to focus on how well they conduce to the general interest. It helps 
us appreciate how ―communications‖ adjust when practices go wrong. If the signals start 
―telling‖ people to go in the wrong direction, will the system correct itself?  Will it tend 
to correct errors? Will it tend to keep up with changes? Also, will it dig up new 
opportunity, new matters for ―communication‖? The allegory of Joy communicating 
instructions is useful because it enables one to reason from the perspective of someone 
who has superior knowledge and purposes that we go along with.   16 
Many writers in the ―Austrian‖ tradition have acknowledged that prices do not 
literally communicate knowledge. In his presidential address to the Society for the 
Development of Austrian Economics, for example, Steven Horwitz (2004) offers the 
felicitous ―knowledge surrogates‖ and references others who likewise seek to salvage 
Hayekian market communication despite the fact that, in a literal sense, prices 
communicate almost nothing. My residual dissatisfaction with Horwitz and others writing 
in the same vein is that they neglect –even stubbornly resist! – explaining the allegory of 
knowledge surrogacy. If they were to unfold the Smithian sort of allegory embedded in 
knowledge surrogacy, they would upset ―Austrian‖ strictures concerning social 
aggregation and social welfare and the particular modernist image of scientific economics 
expounded by Ludwig von Mises (for whom economic theory was axiomatic, categorical, 
apodictic, deductive, wertfrei, etc.). They might become as much ―Scottish‖ as 
―Austrian‖ economists. If latter-day ―Austrians‖ were to open themselves up to Smith, 
see his paramount place in the great conversation, and see that Hayek is closer to Smith 
than to Mises, they would face the choice of either shedding the ―Austrian‖ identity or 
withdrawing into the styles of reasoning distinctive to Mises, Murray Rothbard, and those 
associated today with the Ludwig von Mises Institute. 
 
Unfolding the Allegory Makes It Innocuous 
 
A.L. Macfie (1967a) noted that ―the theory and politics of the eighteenth century 
did not permit of any explicit theory of society as in some sense a living human 
organism‖ (69), and Hayek (1955) was probably right to criticize social-organism   17 
thinking as misleading or worse. But unfolding the allegory is no slippery slope to grief. 
Cannan makes the being an Inca, to make sure that his readers do not start looking around 
for a benevolent, omniscient, omnipotent being. Making the allegory explicit makes it 
clear that it is a fiction. There is no being telling Bridget to replace her ovens. And to the 
extent that moral norms exist within living society, they do not make a social organism. If 
Joy were a God, she would not have any powers over the individual save perhaps that of 
conveying her approbation or disapprobation, sensed within one‘s own breast. The more 
the allegory is spelled out – in particular, as knowing – the less it seems to correspond to 
any external being or institution, perhaps least of all government. Again, Smith was right 
that we work by sympathies with figurative beings, and rejecting such awareness is not 
sensible. But by embracing the insight, and by explicitly developing a figure with certain 
sensibilities, and explaining how different institutional arrangements appeal to those 
sensibilities, liberals and economists may advance a spirit or ethos that contends for 




Agent error is not merely risk that turned out badly. A poker player who makes a 
good bet but draws a ―bad beat‖ did not make an error. One identifies an action as ―error‖ 
from an imagined perspective ex-ante to the play-out, but wise to other potential 
interpretations of the hand. At the agent level, error entails a sense of regret. That is 
absent in the case of the poker player drawing a ―bad beat‖ – who so often afterward 
graciously says: ―That‘s poker.‖ Smith put it this way: ―If notwithstanding all his skill,   18 
however, the good player should, by the influence of chance, happen to lose, the loss 
ought to be a matter, rather of merriment, than of serious sorrow. He has made no false 
stroke; he has done nothing which he ought to be ashamed of…‖ (TMS, 279). 
Israel Kirzner tells of a person walking along the street, seeing and reading a sign 
offering apples for one dollar, yet proceeding to buy apples elsewhere for two dollars. 
Kirzner (1979) writes: ―[S]urely, in an important sense he will, when he realizes his 
mistake, reproach himself for having been so absentminded as to pass by the bargain, 
which he saw, for the more expensive purchase. In this sense he did commit an error, the 
error of not acting on the information available to him or not perceiving fully the 
opportunity before his very nose‖ (129-30). Kirzner repeatedly associates error with 
regret and self-reproach.
14  
Actual regret occurs when you acted on one interpretation of the situation 
(―apples will cost me two dollars‖), and later you reproach yourself for not having had 
the insight and judgment instead to see and act on another superior interpretation (―apples 
will cost me one dollar‖). But, also, the sense of regret or self-reproach can be only 
vicarious or potential.  You might speak of an individual, such as your brother-in-law or 
any of a class of people caught in a familiar syndrome, acting in error because under a not 
fantastic counterfactual – a counterfactual made more relevant and possible by your 
discussing the error – he could see, or could have seen, the better interpretation. 
                                                 
14 This regret/self-reproached-based definition agrees neatly with some of Israel Kirzner‘s expositions of 
error. In my view, however, Kirzner is inconsistent, at times holding a broader conception that would not 
necessarily entail any kind of regret or self-reproach. At page 22 of Kirzner 1992, Kirzner rightly notes that 
the obviousness of the missed opportunity, and hence the basis for regret or self-reproach ―must be a matter 
of degree.‖ The issue, then, becomes how one draws the lines to delineate error. At times Kirzner, as in the 
quoted passage, seems to draw the lines, as I do (Klein 1999, 64-69), such that error is the missing of 
obvious opportunities and entails a sense of regret, but at other times (e.g., Kirzner 1992, 21-23) he draws 
the lines much wider, at not-totally-unobvious, and drops the necessity of any regret or self-reproach. For 
further discussion of the difference, see Klein & Briggeman (2010b).   19 
In discussing affection as habitual sympathy, Smith (TMS) brings up the 
syndrome of family members who have grown up in absence: ―The absent son, the absent 
brother, is not like other ordinary sons and brothers; but an all-perfect son, an all-perfect 
brother; and the most romantic hopes are entertained of the happiness to be enjoyed in the 
friendship and conversation of such persons … Time and experience, however, I am 
afraid, too frequently undeceive them‖ (221).  
Such a syndrome is an example of error based on regret that may be only 
vicarious or potential. If someone you know lays plans to reunite with a previously absent 
and supposedly perfect relative, you might say that he acts in error, because you see 
vicariously, or he sees potentially, the badness of the interpretation he acts on. His 
interpretive lenses are rose-tinted. A better interpretation is available – he can find it in on 
page 221 of The Theory of Moral Sentiments. 
Smith (1761, 219) noted that the word I simultaneously carries two significations, 
one of ―the most precise individuality,‖ the other of ―the most extensive generalization.‖ 
These two significations are only ―seemingly opposite‖ (italics mine), for human 
individuality is not all that individual. We put ourselves in each other‘s shoes, relate to 
the apparent situation, and judge of each other‘s actions. Just as Hayek indicated a zone 
in which we carefully invoke a notion of social sense or function, we work in zones of 
generalization in which we feel we know the individual‘s purposes and situation well 
enough to judge of his action. The zone is a sort of overlap region, an intersection of 
closeness to the individual, to understand his partial view of things, and distance from 
him so as not to be entangled in his partialness. As Forman-Barzilai puts it, ―for Smith, 
the sympathy model is effective for producing impartial moral judgments because the   20 
spectator is at once both involved and detached‖ (2005, 193). And further: ―an ideal 
Smithian perspective will be that of a spectator who is essentially Janus-faced: near 
enough to access the meaning and vicissitudes of a particular situation but distant enough 
not to be entangled within them – both hot and cool‖ (204). 
Self-reproach is reflexive, entailing a sort of multiplicity of selves. It is useful to 
think of an actor calling on internal sub-agents or routines. When the sub-agent or routine 
messes up in the instant, spilling a drink or mistyping a word, the mishap is best called a 
mistake. The actor curses angrily, as though reprimanding a subordinate. But the actor 
saying I in the situation is itself an agency embedded in a larger being, and sometimes it 
comes to doubt itself, it feels that it employs the wrong routines, it suspects that it has 
made an error. It feels regret, not anger. The actor resides in a hierarchy. Error for him 
relates to what is above, mistakes to what is below. Erring is poorly interpreting the 
situation; making a mistake is slipping-up within the situation. Error is regretting the path 
one embarked on; mistake is slipping-up along the path. Likewise, on the happy side, 
affirmation of the plan may be distinguished from fulfillment of the plan. Plan 
affirmation does not imply plan fulfillment, and plan fulfillment does not imply plan 
affirmation.
15 Although the terms mistake and error are often used interchangeably,
16 
economists have found it useful to distinguish them.
17 Also, it should be noted that it is 
impossible to eradicate a theoretical domain for error, for any agent that says I must 
                                                 
15 The distinction is elaborated in Klein and Briggeman (2010b).  
16 One reason that error and mistake are often used interchangeably is that mistakes alert us to possible 
error – if a student‘s paper is filled with mistakes, maybe he needs to rethink his idea of having done his 
homework. Another is that action is situated, such that what is to one agent an error may be to a higher 
agent a mistake, just as the 5
th floor of a building is up to some and down to others. Yet another reason may 
be that there is no verb for mistake, and hence we resort to using the verb to err even for mistakes. 
17 Our distinction between mistake and error comports with Kirzner (1979, 121-22) and with the distinction 
made by Polanyi (1963) between ―faults committed within an acceptable framework‖ and ―rational 
applications of an unacceptable framework‖ (87).    21 
emerge from and be subordinate to higher (or deeper) levels. The uppermost articulated 
level carries hints, understandings, questions, and aspirations relating to a lowermost non-
articulated level, and it is fatal to deny the tacit contacts to higher matters.
18 As a practical 
matter, there is always a realm above the articulated I, there is always a yet superior 
character (cf TMS, 137), a yet more exalted propriety (cf TMS, 192). 
Correction for each differs. Correcting a mistake is simply revising the instant. A 
typing mistake is corrected by retyping the word. Correcting, or overcoming, an error 
involves more significant reform of the actor and his notion of how he manages his sub-
routines.  
In his economics, Adam Smith gave too scant attention to these matters.
19 In the 
morals, however, he linked error and remorse. For example, he tells of characters in 
Voltaire who, faced with conflicting interpretations of their moral duty, commit a crime 
and then ―discover their error, and the fraud which had deceived them, and are distracted 
with horror, remorse, and resentment‖ (177; see also 158).
20 Smith‘s thought is suffused 
with appreciation of knowledge‘s richness.
21 
 
Error and Correction as Applied to an Allegorical Being 
 
                                                 
18 See Polanyi 1962; 1963; 1967; Hayek 1952, 185, 189, 194; 1955, 89; 1967, 62; Klein 1999, 69-71. 
19 Smith‘s deficiency was picked up on by others including Jeremy Bentham (extracted 2008), J.B. Say (see 
quotes in Hodgskin 1827, 54-57), Thomas Hodgskin (1827, 34, 45-99, 120), James Maitland Lauderdale 
(1819, 265-304), and John Rae. Regarding the last two, Macfie (1967a) writes: ―[Lauderdale and Rae] 
thought Smith‘s theory should give more weight to the importance of invention, novelty, new arrangements 
in history. Smith, of course, did much here, but to Lauderdale and Rae invention is picked on as the core of 
economic growth, and this is suggested as the central issue in theory and practice. One cannot say this of 
the Wealth of Nations‖ (35). 
20 Also, in discussing self-deceit, Smith mentions error and regret (158). 
21 Another prime example is when Smith (WN) says that, in the matter of judging how society‘s interest 
relates to his own, one may be ―unfit to judge even though he was fully informed‖ (266).   22 
The preceding section supplied a formulation of agent error and agent correction. 
When it comes to ―market error,‖ ―social error‖ or ―policy error,‖ we find statements that 
are best expounded by way of a figurative being. The statements are meaningful 
fundamentally as agent error applied to an allegorical being.  
Israel Kirzner has much to teach humankind, but, his protestations 
notwithstanding, many of his teachings make sense only by virtue of Smithian turns and 
qualifications. In the case of market error, Kirzner writes: 
Except in the never-attained state of complete equilibrium, each market is 
characterized by opportunities for pure entrepreneurial profit. These opportunities 
are created by earlier entrepreneurial errors which have resulted in shortages, 
surplus, misallocated resources. (Kirzner 2000, 16; italics mine) 
 
Consider an example raised by Kirzner (250f), the invention of the automobile. 
Kirzner suggests that it devastated the livelihoods of many who had built their entire 
careers around the horse-drawn carriage industry. Kirzner‘s writings would suggest that 
the malinvestments were a result of error. Such unfulfilled plans were based on ―an 
erroneously imagined decision framework‖ (17). Kirzner links the earlier error with a 
process of correction. He writes that ―earlier entrepreneurial errors have created profit 
opportunities which provide the incentives of entrepreneurial corrective decisions to be 
made‖ (31). Elsewhere Kirzner (1985) writes that ―To act entrepreneurially is to identify 
situations overlooked until now because of error‖ (52). 
Speaking historically, surely some of those in the horse-drawn carriage industry 
had erred. But the invention of the automobile was a highly exceptional event. It is 
possible that only some, it is conceivable, in fact, that none, in the horse-drawn carriage 
industry actually looked back on their undertakings with a feeling that they had acted 
foolishly, that they should have been more aware than they were. They may not have   23 
erred. They may have all felt like the poker player who made a good play but drew a ―bad 
beat.‖ Similarly, it is conceivable that no individual undertook any correction of a 
foregoing error.  
The general interpretation of market correction is best expounded as analogous to 
how a figurative being who gives instructions might have felt about it. As we look back 
on the economic history, we know things that our predecessors did not, and we attribute 
such knowledge to our figurative being. If Joy knew what was coming – and surely some 
inventors had early anticipations of what was in fact coming – and she nonetheless 
communicated instructions to build and expand livery stables and stage-coach lines – 
undertakings that subsequently did not pay off socially – Joy would be erring. Her giving 
of such instructions is something that she would look back on with regret, or self-
reproach. She would feel she erred. As those bad instructions were reversed and she 
reconsidered whatever had impelled such a faulty plan, she would be correcting her 
error. Like the metaphor of market communication, the talk of market error and 
correction is fundamentally understood by way of allegory. 
If we deny the allegory, if we confine our thinking and talk to agent error and 
correction, we may fall into statements that are not justifiable in those terms. But the 
point here is not to avoid talk of market communication, error, and correction. Kirzner‘s 
theorizing, indeed, may help us see how Joy error and correction relate to agent error and 
correction, and thus to justify the figurative theorizing. The theorist typically invokes a 
perspective that no one in the story quite possesses, a perspective attributed to some 
enlarged beholder.  Again, the Joy-like being is not a glinty inscrutable figure, but a being 
that understands and sympathizes with us, a being in the zone of both intimate knowledge   24 
and less partiality. Her benevolence is such that what makes a set of instructions 
erroneous for her tends to correspond to vicarious or potential errors for people in the 
story of the market process. Kirzner is right that equilibrium modeling provides no scope 
for human error or human imagination (2000, 59); his brilliance lies in seeing the need 
and doing the work to get such things into economic theory. But our endeavor gains by 
unfolding the Smithian elements – a turn vehemently rejected by Kirzner (2000, ch. 7; 
2010). Behind the will of the individual as he goes about his market activity there are 
figurative beings, perhaps only inchoate or unconscious,
22 and behind the theorizing of 
the economist there are figurative beings seemingly appropriate to the discourse situation, 
and the two are related. The error of the individual may be only vicarious or potential – 
in that it invokes an onlooker who reinterprets what he does. That onlooker is related to 
the onlooker invoked by the theorist who talks of market error and correction. Lon Fuller, 
an eminent legal scholar whose work drew in a fundamental way on The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, wrote the following:  
The economist may not care what the consumer wants, but he cannot be 
indifferent to the process by which the consumer reaches his decision as to what 
he wants. If he is to understand that process, the economist must be capable of 
participating in it vicariously and have an understanding of its terms. (Fuller 1969, 
18) 
 
The relatedness between theorizer and theorized, like that between judge and 
judged of, may draw on Kirzner‘s insights and help give them power, for, if Kirzner is 
right, and I think he is, that, in most (though not all) market moments, there is a tendency 
for the individual to correct his errors, and there is no tendency for him to make errors 
                                                 
22 James Otteson stresses that our moral bearings may be unconscious, 2002, 21, 104-06, 116, 123-24, 264.   25 
(Kirzner 2000, 31), then the suggested relatedness helps to sustain the general idea that 
there are tendencies for market processes to avoid and correct Joy errors.  
The being with an invisible hand is an allegory invoked in theorizing about 
spontaneous order, a being that sees the particulars of what to us remain only abstract 
generalizations, abstract theoretical tendencies. Meanwhile, the impartial spectator – or, 
rather, his representative (TMS, 215) – is the ordinary individual‘s moral counselor, 
especially sensitive to commutative justice and established propriety but also to the 
becoming virtues. Perhaps Joy corresponds in some way to both. Perhaps we have a 
duality, or at least a potential duality. Smith says that religion ―gave a sanction to the 
rules of morality, long before the age of artificial reasoning and philosophy‖ (TMS, 164). 
In the age of artificial reasoning and philosophy, perhaps common understandings of vast 
social coordination and common understandings of mundane propriety evolve along 
paths potentially roughly parallel, depending on the cultural ecology. 
 
Social or Policy Error 
 
Adam Smith favored separation of church and state but was concerned that little 
sects might breed morals ―disagreeably rigorous and unsocial‖ and suggested ―remedies‖ 
by which the state might ―correct whatever was unsocial or disagreeably rigorous in the 
morals of all the little sects‖ (WN, 796, italics mine). Does Smith mean to say that the 
state corrects the agent error of the individual sectarian? I think not, at least not primarily. 
The correction and implied error are social, which is to say allegorical. Smith‘s talk is 
perfectly natural, but the allegory is rarely spelled out. Consider a matter in which   26 
economists often diagnose the existing interventionist policy as error and prescribe 
correction in the form of liberalization. 
Economists who study the U.S. Food and Drug Administration are accustomed to 
analyzing its decision of whether to permit a new drug as one involving a trade-off 
between two possible bad outcomes, as shown in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: Two Types of Bad Outcomes for FDA Decision 
   








Type-1 Bad Outcome: 
Permitting a bad drug. 
Victims are identifiable, 








Type-2 Bad Outcome: 
Not permitting a beneficial 
drug. Victims are not 
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Economists say the FDA apparatus is faulty in that the FDA officials are overly 
prone to Type-2 bad outcome; FDA officials are too stingy with permission.  Economists 
who publish judgments on the matter really do very preponderantly say this.
23 I should 
note that economists‘ judgments are based significantly also on the suppression of drug 
development – that is, restrictiveness discourages researchers and drug makers from 
                                                 
23 See Klein 2008, 319. Meanwhile, Klein and Briggeman (2010a) have ethically summoned 305 
economists to a smart questionnaire on the policy of banned-till-permitted, yielding a bona fide 
enlargement of conversation.   27 
generating many would-have-been drugs from ever being in a position to enter into the 
context of Figure 1. 
In the literature, bad outcome is often called ―error,‖ but I want to focus on the 
higher level managing of the trade-off between the bad outcomes. I suggest that standard 
discourse implicitly projects the allegory of Joy running a benevolent and super-
knowledgeable system of communications and cooperation. We confine her possible 
communication to instructions about the general stance the official should take, that is, 
his stance with respect to permissiveness.
24 Every outcome involves an element of luck. 
Just as in poker a lost hand does not necessarily indicate bad play, an unfortunate 
outcome does not necessarily indicate error. Joy‘s communication tells the FDA official 
how permissive to be, what ―cut points‖ to use, in deciding whether to permit drugs.
25   
FDA officials are too stingy. It is said that ―the FDA is erring‖ or ―society is 
erring‖ or ―we are erring.‖ But the ―error‖ talk is best understood by way of an allegory 
involving a being like Joy. If the FDA‘s actions flowed from Joy‘s communications, then 
we would deem Joy‘s communications to be in error, for her communications would in 
that case have FDA officials too often withholding permission. The definition of agent 
error is being applied to Joy, as the agent in question.   
But Joy‘s point of view stands in contrast to that of the FDA official as the 
structures actually exist and function.  Economists, including Stigler (1966, 74-75) and 
Coase (1975, 59), have been quick to explain that the individual FDA reviewer does not 
                                                 
24 If we, instead, allowed Joy‘s instructions to be specific to each individual drug decision, so that Joy 
might use her super knowledge of the particular case, we would weaken the affinity between the agent‘s 
context and Joy‘s framework for issuing instructions. 
25 Conceivably these ―cut points‖ would otherwise become so permissive as to run into further issues of the 
FDA abiding by the legislation that it is charged with executing, but it is clear that there is ample scope for 
relaxation without running into such issues.   28 
necessarily err when he is stingy with permission, because the consequences of 
permitting a bad drug loom much larger for him personally than do the consequences of 
not permitting a good drug.  Although it is possible that the human agents involved in the 
process do err, the more central point is that they need not: The high rate of Type-2 bad 
outcomes (and the associate suppression of drug development) does not necessarily 
reflect any agent error. The human agents do not necessarily feel any regret or self-
reproach, even of only the vicarious or potential sorts. Perhaps the error told of in the 
familiar analysis is only figurative. 
The figurative dimension does not hinge on assuming no agent error. Even if we 
assume that some of the agents did err, it is the figurative that is more fundamental. The 
vicarious or potential regret can be said to fall back on some notion of a generalized 
being the actor could have sympathized with, could have seen himself as like. Indeed, 
Smith‘s internal arbiters – he speaks of the conscience, the inhabitant, inmate, or man 
within the breast, the impartial spectator, the supposed impartial spectator, the 
representative of the impartial spectator – are all usefully interpreted as allegorical or 
metaphorical figures. Smith even lets on: ―The real or even imaginary presence of the 
impartial spectator, the authority of the man within the breast, is always at hand …‖ 
(TMS, 292, italics mine).  
I suspect that the conclusion that there is social error without any agent error rubs 
us, as human beings, the wrong way. I suspect that we are programmed
26 to think that if 
there is social error, somewhere along the line there must be agent errors. If, as some 
allege, our instincts are rooted in the Paleolithic small band, a society so simple that any 
                                                 
26 Programmed, that is culturally or genetically, though, as Hayek argues, culture plays such a large role in 
both genetic selection that the distinction is dubious.   29 
sense of social error would plausibly be amenable to correction by the alphas, it would 
make sense that we instinctively feel that social error implies agent error. 
I suspect that we are programmed to think that Smith‘s fourth source of moral 
approval, particularly the aesthetic beauty in the social system writ large advancing 
happiness, tends to go with the other three sources, which have to do with the propriety of 
the micro behaviors in terms of the actor‘s intentions, the moral responses of those 
effected, and how those micro interactions fit customs or established rules of conduct. 
Indeed, there are cultural dynamics that may give rise to such consonance among the four 
sources of moral approval: When some analyst, at 100,000 feet up, notices failings at the 
grand fourth source she tends to voice them and challenge the sense of propriety that has 
till now inhered in the baneful microbehaviors. In a book like Thomas Schelling‘s 
Micromotives and Macrobehavior (1978), someone explains how erstwhile blameless 
micromotives spell bad macrobehavior, people read the book, and the troublesome 
microbehavior becomes less blameless. Smith, who rode a position of cultural royalty, 
tended in TMS to play up such consonance, at least in affairs among ―equals.‖ 
But in a world checkered with baneful policies that enjoy official propriety and 
the assent or even approval of the cultural elites, and are awfully impervious to challenge, 
the presumption of consonance seems much less assured. We should allow that even very 
persistent Joy error does not necessarily entail any agent error of the actual sort (as 
opposed to the vicarious or potential sorts). If humans tend to over-estimate the 
traversability of the impasse between Joy error and agent error, that could help explain 
why they are disinclined to bring out the allegory behind social error, for they feel they 
can make due by indicating agent errors.    30 
Humane optimism and aspiration certainly goes along with supposing that 
someone on the ground could feel self-reproach in his helping to establish or preserve 
what, from 100,000 feet up, is seen as a baneful arrangement of practices. At any rate, the 
culture tends to welcome such humane optimism. Presuming agent error, focusing on 
agent error, then, signals one‘s rejection of the disagreeable, fatalistic view of no agent 
error. Indeed, to embrace the fatalistic view, to surrender hope for potential agent regret 
and efforts at vicarious agent regret, would be to give up engagement and fundamentally 
to reject Smith‘s Solonic outlook. Signaling against the fatalistic view might help explain 
why the allegory remains as tacit as it does.
27 
 
Social or Policy Correction – or Lack thereof 
 
Hayek, Kirzner, Armen Alchian (1950), and others have stressed that the fertility 
and flexibility of an economic system lies in its propensities to correct its own errors – 
that is, Joy errors. Consider what happens when an FDA-permitted drug is found to be 
harmful. Patients suffer and actors in the private nexus adjust rapidly, as the patients, 
doctors, pharmacies, health institutions, the manufacturer, lawyers, journalists, and others 
quickly stop the harm; they act quickly to correct the Joy errors.  
How well do Joy errors located in government self-correct? Permitting a bad drug 
leads to identifiable sufferers and public outcry. Not permitting a beneficial drug, 
                                                 
27 Incidentally, among the ways that the great economist George Stigler in his last three decades 
distinguished himself was by propounding the fatalistic view (e.g., 1982), as well as by championing the 
related views that knowledge should be flattened down to information and that the concept of liberty was 
nugatory. His inconsistencies and absurdities in these matters were often so immediate that sympathetic 
onlookers tend to see his sermons as arch irony. Less sympathetic onlookers may see them as irresponsible 
whimsy.   31 
however, leads to little public outcry. The suffering is relatively neglected, unseen, 
overshadowed by what is officially intended. FDA critics who identify the Joy error in 
FDA stinginess – who, that is, do the analysis at Smith‘s fourth source – seem to have 
very little political or cultural traction; they too seem to be largely ignored. That is why 
the FDA official may feel secure and just as regards Smith‘s first three sources of moral 
approval. Moreover, each person tends to get locked into basic beliefs and outlooks,
28 – 
―I may become more deeply entrenched in my historical context, progressively less 
capable of understanding myself and others‖ (Forman-Barlizai 2005, 208) – a fact that 
dims our hopes of her coming to feel regret. Within the socio-politico-cultural ecology, 
therefore, the evolution of the links between Joy interest and agent interest, the process 
for correcting Joy errors, is often extremely bad.  
Smith and Hayek taught that libertarian arrangements tend to align Joy and agent 
interest. In the free context, most Joy errors tend to be self-correcting. In a highly 
governmentalized context, many of the most grievous Joy errors do not have similar 
tendencies toward self-correction. Buchanan (1999) says: ―There is no political 
counterpart to Adam Smith‘s invisible hand‖ (458). 
 
Agent Error Is a Matter of Culture 
The FDA official may purport to be deciding with the general interest in mind – 
he may purport to be following the communications that would flow from a benevolent 
figurative being. Yet often his decisions do not serve the general interest, either because 
                                                 
28 On the lock-in of ideological views by the age of 25 or 30, see for example Jennings (1990, 347-48), 
Alwin et al (1991, 60), and Sears and Funk (1999, 1). Smith (TMS, 158), Kierkegaard, and Schopenhauer 
also commented on such lock-in.   32 
the purporting is phony or because he misunderstands the general interest and how to 
advance it. Perhaps his figurative beings differ quite fundamentally from others‘.  
One reason that the micro contexts of bad policy often feel just is that, by 
procedure and by taboo, political culture has cordoned off certain aspects and 
consequences, particularly those on coercees and their would-be trading partners, into 
seemingly separate moral contexts or, indeed, into docility, acquiescence, silence, and 
invisibility. Whether the FDA official would reproach himself for being stingy depends 
on his moral qualities, intellectual understandings, and cultural pressures. As Forman-
Barzilai (2005) says, rendering an enlarged cross-cultural judgment ―requires that the 
spectator be able to question and sometimes subvert the very measure by which he has 
become accustomed to judging himself and the world‖ (207). Lauren Brubaker expresses 
similar concerns:  
The desire to receive the sympathy or approval of others, however, leads us to 
conform to the opinions of others. When the actual spectators and the impartial 
spectator are in conflict, as is almost always the case when there are divisions or 
disagreements in society, the desire for sympathy is corrupting. Under most 
political conditions, then, the natural desire for sympathy leads us to adopt the 
partial opinions of our religious, ethnic, political or economic peers at the expense 
of impartiality. (Brubaker, 2006, 200-01) 
 
What is so saddening about governmentalization is that it not merely suppresses 
the fruits of voluntary actions but breeds cultures that make the bonds of candid and 
natural discourse, sympathy, and approbation so clouded, conflicted, and weak. Smith 
writes: 
The great pleasure of conversation and society, besides, arises from a certain 
correspondence of sentiments and opinions, from a certain harmony of minds,   33 
which like so many musical instruments coincide and keep time with one another. 
But this most delightful harmony cannot be obtained unless there is a free 
communication of sentiments and opinions. (TMS, 337) 
 
Governmentalization sometimes perversely tends toward the disjoining of one 
source level from the next, yielding cultural confusion, degeneracy, deep disharmonies, 
and unhappiness. For many people, these moral and cultural consequences are quite 
central in judging policy and politics – more central, in fact, than they usually manage to 
communicate. We want a better world materially, but more importantly we want a better 
world culturally. Indeed, when we read Smith‘s descriptions of the ―superior stations,‖ 
where, unlike ―the middling and inferior stations,‖ honesty is not the best policy (TMS, 
63-66), when we notice Smith‘s confidence in and favor for active agency, rather than 
passive bystanding (TMS, 68, 83, 137, 188-191), when we heed his emphasis on the love 
and esteem of ―those we live with,‖
29 we feel that Smith is concerned primarily with the 
moral and cultural, as opposed to the material. ―What can be added to the happiness of 
the man,‖ Smith asks, ―who is in health, who is out of debt, and has a clear conscience?‖ 
(TMS, 45). 
In addition to the officially superior stations, things are difficult also when it 
comes to cultural figures. One must judge the wisdom and scruple of the scholar and the 
pundit. He may be very eminent and, by well established standards, satisfy moral norms 
at the first three sources of moral approval, but his ideas may be nefarious and fail in the 
matter of the fourth source, although he does not think so.  
Some measure of correction may come by directing understanding, criticism, and 
judgment to what is being done and what should be done. These efforts help to align Joy 
                                                 
29 TMS, 116, 122, 166-67, 200, 213, 253-54, 272, 295, 297, 298, 307.   34 
error and agent error. After all, what actually keeps government and political culture from 
being much worse is not any democratic accountability but rather the fair measure of 
decency and enlightenment nestled within each agent within those structures. It is 
primarily as lattice of not-too-terribly-unenlightened despots that politics works as well 




Most of the morality plays in The Theory of Moral Sentiments are of a private 
nature, interaction among neighbors or ―equals,‖
30 in which the broad social view plays 
little role.  That is why the impartial spectator is usually thought to be a personal moral 
advisor, not a political economist. The Wealth of Nations, however, was an annex of The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments, making together a more extensive system of moral 
sentiments. The Wealth of Nations explores the extensive view in TMS‘s fourth source 
especially as concerns commercial behavior and public policy.
31 In WN, Smith suggested 
that the legislature direct its deliberations ―not by the clamorous importunity of partial 
interests, but by an extensive view of the general good‖ (471-72, italics added). Smith is 
being allegorical, for, in a literal sense, no human being has any such extensive view. The 
allegorical being Joy has such an extensive view. Smith is saying that we should 
scrupulously develop and mind our thinking about Joy‘s sentiments about what she sees. 
                                                 
30 As noted by the TMS editors D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie (p.40), from the fourth edition (1774) on, 
the title page included a description of the work: ―The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Or An Essay towards 
an Analysis of the Principles by which Men naturally judge concerning the Conduct and Character, first of 
their Neighbours, and afterwards of themselves‖ (emphasis mine). 
31 My remarks about WN as an annex of TMS comport with Stewart 1794, 310-15; Haakonssen 1981, Ch. 4; 
Young 1997, Ch. 8, esp. pp. 192-93, 201; Macfie 1967, 61-62, 75f; and Otteson 2002.   35 
Sympathize with Joy‘s best representatives, not with partial interests. Upon such allegory 
we develop the scruple to overcome the errors of partiality. 
Contrary to what Alec Macfie (1967b, 10) and Vivienne Brown observe (1994, 
46), perhaps the impartial spectator does appear in The Wealth of Nations – as the author 
(as suggested by Bitterman 1940, 520).
32 For, if the inmate within the reader‘s breast is 
its representative, and if ―To direct the judgments of this inmate is the great purpose of all 
systems of morality‖ (TMS, 293; see also 329), then the author of such a system, if 
edifying and properly so, would be akin to the impartial spectator.  
Smith was culturally tops in his day, but times have changed. In the worst cases, 
totalitarian cases, Hayek suggested, the worst get on top. The situation today in the 
United States and elsewhere is not nearly as bad as that, but still many of the positions of 
greatest political and cultural power tend to attract, breed, or prosper people who are less 
than attuned to Smith‘s moral and economic sensibilities. Those more attuned may 
criticize them, but such criticism may smack up against the simpler sources of moral 
approval. It is obnoxious and offensive, at least to those criticized and all who go along 
with their sentiments and eminence. One consequence may be dismissal and freeze-out of 
our enlightened critic, reducing the good he does.  
In a letter to David Ricardo, James Mill (1818) urged Ricardo to follow ―the plain 
rule of utility which will always guide you right, and in which there is no mystery.‖ 
Quoting the passage, A.L. Macfie (1967a) adds: ―No mystery for James Mill; but for 
Adam Smith there was always mystery‖ (146). For those who heed moral guides like 
                                                 
32 The phrase ―impartial spectator‖ does not appear in The Wealth of Nations, but in the closing pages 
Smith writes that a union between Great Britain and the colonies would put the colonists at a great distance 
from ―the center of the empire‖—London—and would render ―them more indifferent and impartial 
spectators of the conduct of all‖ (WN: 945).   36 
those heeded by Smith and Hayek, the mystery may seem to grow ever more perplexing, 
but, still, there are helpful answers and less partial resolutions. There is sense in the 
liberal cultural project. That sense is well served by bringing implicit figures more clearly 
out into the open. 
 
Appendix: 
Adam Smith‘s paragraph about the four sources of moral approval 
 
Here Adam Smith is criticizing Francis Hutcheson‘s doctrine of a moral sense. Smith 
writes that in his own system the four sources of moral approval leave no place for a 
further moral sense. 
 
When we approve of any character or action, the sentiments which we feel, are, 
according to the foregoing system, derived from four sources, which are in some 
respects different from one another. First, we sympathize with the motives of the 
agent; secondly, we enter into the gratitude of those who receive the benefit of his 
actions; thirdly, we observe that his conduct has been agreeable to the general 
rules by which those two sympathies generally act; and, last of all, when we 
consider such actions as making a part of a system of behaviour which tends to 
promote the happiness either of the individual or of the society, they appear to 
derive a beauty from this utility, not unlike that which we ascribe to any well-
contrived machine. After deducting, in any one particular case, all that must be 
acknowledged to proceed from some one or other of these four principles, I 
should be glad to know what remains, and I shall freely allow this overplus to be 
ascribed to a moral sense, or to any other peculiar faculty, provided any body will 
ascertain precisely what this overplus is. It might be expected, perhaps, that if 
there was any such peculiar principle, such as this moral sense is supposed to be, 
we should feel it, in some particular cases, separated and detached from every 
other, as we often feel joy, sorrow, hope, and fear, pure and unmixed with any 
other emotion. This however, I imagine, cannot even be pretended. I have never 
heard any instance alleged in which this principle could be said to exert itself 
alone and unmixed with sympathy or antipathy, with gratitude or resentment, with 
the perception of the agreement or disagreement of any action to an established 
rule, or last of all with that general taste for beauty and order which is excited by 
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